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AEROSPACE LAW -
SUBJECT MATTER AND TERMINOLOGY
By JOHN COBB COOPERt
A S THE terms Air Law and Space Law are now used, they represent
nothing more than phases of the law directly and indirectly applicable
to man-made flight. To avoid existing and future confusion, both should be
included in a single branch of the law. This might be termed Aerospace
Law.
Aerospace was defined in a glossary published in 1959 by the Research
Studies Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base as follows: "The earth's en-
velope of air and the space above it, the two considered as a single realm
for activity in the flight of air vehicles and in the launching, guidance,
and control of ballistic missiles, earth satellites, dirigible space vehicles, and
the like." The terms aerospace engineering and aerospace sciences are now
widely used to indicate the indivisible and inclusive character of engineer-
ing and scientific actions and functions related to flight at any altitude.
The term aerospace power was also used in the same glossary as repre-
senting the "power of man, derived from his ability to fly vehicles in the
air and in space." The official journal of the Air Force Association, Air
Force and Space Digest, is designated by its publishers as The Magazine of
Aerospace Power.
The proposal that a single branch of the law should include all rules
and regulations applicable to flight, is not new. My own views were ex-
pressed in a memorandum prepared for the opening of The Institute of
International Air Law at McGill University in 1951, several years prior
to the launching of Sputnik 1. These views were repeated and expanded
in an article entitled "Air Law-a Field of International Thinking," pub-
lished in 1951, in Transport and Communications Review (Vol. IV No.
4 p. 1), issued by the Transport and Communications Division, Depart-
ment of Economic Affairs, United Nations. I then urged that the term
Air Law be used in a broadened sense.
Discussing Article 1 of the Chicago Convention of 1944 and its recogni-
tion that "every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the
airspace above its territory," I said:
Each State has, under this rule, exclusive sovereignty over whatever area above
the surface of the State may, under any given circumstances, be included in
the term airspace. But no international decision has yet been made as to the
legal status of those areas of space above this airspace even though such areas
are today usable for such flight instrumentalities as rockets or guided missiles.
International legal thinking must solve the resulting difficulties.
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After asserting that "it seems obvious that we must agree that there is
an upper boundary in space to the territory of subjacent States," the
statement continued:
The entire question as to the proper construction of Article 1 of the Con-
vention is still open. If and when agreement is reached, the rules to be applied
in both the areas where gaseous air is present and in the areas beyond should
be included in a single branch of the law. This, for convenience, we can still
designate as Air Law. Its rules will include provisions as to the right of each
State to control space up to the agreed altitude as well as the rights of all
States in the outer space beyond. The law cannot ignore any form of human
activity, particularly if such activity affects the relations between nation-
states as well as between individuals. If Air Law is to present an adequate,
complete and well-rounded body of rules for the government of all forms of
human activity relating to what may properly be termed flight, then the rules
of Air Law should include regulatory provisions applicable to every form of
instrumentality which produces man-made or man-controlled flight through
space above and beyond the surface of the earth. If this broad view of the
scope of Air Law be not accepted, arbitrary and illogical distinctions must
be made between various types of flight instrumentalities with resulting prac-
tical and legal confusion.
I then urged that the terms flight, flight-space and flight instrumentality
should be used where the terms air navigation, airspace and aircraft were
customarily used, suggesting the following two basic definitions:
Flight includes any movement through space of man-operated or man-
controlled devices or instrumentalities (to be known as flight instrumentali-
ties) such as balloons, dirigibles, airplanes, rockets, guided missiles, or space
ships.
Flight-space means so much of universal space above and beyond the sur-
face of the earth as is now used or may hereafter be used as the area in which
flight takes place.
It would appear that the present widely used term aerospace is practically
identical in meaning with the term flight-space suggested in 1951. But
the possible suggested broad use of the term Air Law to cover all flight and
related activities was not widely accepted. Instead most writers still use
the term Air Law in the narrow sense as the equivalent of aeronautical
law. Aeronautics has been defined as the "art, science, or business of de-
signing, manufacturing and operating vehicles that move through the
air." In this sense McNair said in opening the first edition of his Law of
the Air in 1932; "The aim of this book is to state the aeronautical law
of England."
Since orbital flight became a fact, the new term Space Law has been
widely used, but without exact analysis or definition. One thing is, how-
ever, very clear-if Air Law and Space Law are to be treated as separate
branches of the law, overlapping will certainly result, even dangerous
contradiction. Confusion already exists. In the mushrooming literature
of official and academic statements, conferences, addresses and learned
papers, it is quite impossible to determine the exact extent of Space Law
subject matter. At times it seems limited to those rules geographically ap-
plicable in areas of usable space beyond the airspace-admittedly an un-
certain boundary. At other times the term Space Law seems to include
any regulation of those flight instrumentalities capable of outer space
flight, wherever they are, even while in the airspace or on the ground.
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This is not a healthy situation. The rules of law should be clear and their
application unquestioned.
Some of the difficulties which must arise in treating space law as a
subject apart from air law, are illustrated in the recently published Draft
Code of Rules on the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, prepared by
a Study Group of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International
Studies, London. The Chairman of the Study Group was Professor R. Y.
Jennings, Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge, and the
reporter was Mr. J. E. S. Fawcett, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.
The Group included many other highly qualified experts. The publication
is perhaps the best and most useful which has thus far appeared dealing
with the assigned subject matter. The introduction states that the Study
Group "concluded that this is a good time to publish a document bringing
together what appear to be the basic principles of the developing space
law." An examination of the resulting rules discloses, however, that the
able authors found it necessary to include rules which are certainly within
the historic and logical province of air law, even in its limited sense of
aeronautical law. For example, the draft code includes a definition of
aircraft. Also it proposes the following: "Air Space means the volume of
space between the surface of the earth at sea level and an altitude of
80,000 meters above it." This definition is in substance an addition to or
modification of Article 1 of the Chicago Convention of 1944. The altitude
of the absolute and unilateral sovereign rights of the subjacent State in the
air space is an integral part of one of the primary rules of any complete
statement of air law subject matter.
Also particularly noteworthy is paragraph 2.4 of the David Davies Me-
morial Institute Proposed Rules, reading as follows: "No State or inter-
national body shall put the airspace, outer space or the celestial bodies,
to uses which cause, or are likely to cause, modifications of the environ-
ment of mankind unless the prior agreement of the appropriate interna-
tional body has been obtained that such modifications are acceptable."
Clearly this rule would be applicable to aircraft in the airspace if the
use came within the prohibited categories. Paragraph 4.1 seems also de-
signed, at least in part, to state new rules applicable to the use of airspace,
perhaps requiring a modification of the Chicago Convention of 1944 to
become effective. The suggested rule is as follows:
No spacecraft launched from the territory of any State may at any state of
its flight enter the airspace of another State without the consent of that
State: provided that
a. such consent shall not be withheld if prior notice has been given to that
State of the intended flight, and it has been shown to its satisfaction that
the flight is solely for scientific and peaceful purposes and shall be so
controlled as to obviate danger to aircraft;
b. any craft capable of operating both as a spacecraft and as an aircraft
shall for the purpose of its use of the airspace be deemed to be an aircraft;
c. a manned spacecraft may enter the airspace without prior consent for
the purpose of making an emergency landing, but shall be subject to the
provisions of Section b.
Paragraph 6.1 deals with liability, stating:
The State or States or international body responsible for the launching of a
spacecraft shall be liable for any breach of this Draft Code in which it may
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be involved, for any injury or loss caused by the spacecraft, or any part of it
a. by physical impact, contamination, or otherwise, to any person or prop-
erty whatsoever outside the territory of the State responsible for the flight
of the spacecraft;
b. as a result of collision or navigational interference, to any aircraft,
1. in the airspace of another State; or
2. of a nationality other than that of the spacecraft, without proof of
negligence in the operation of the spacecraft being required.
The rules thus proposed appear to be applicable in outer space, and also
under certain circumstances, in the airspace and on the surface of the
earth. These rules would require the modification of present aeronautical
rules, or the adoption of new rules applicable on the earth and in the air-
space, and would affect flight instrumentalities other than spacecraft.
Careful examination of the entire group of rules as proposed by the
Study Group headed by Professor Jennings shows clearly that it is not
possible to consider Space Law except as a part of a wide general branch
of the law dealing with flight and flight instrumentalities of all kinds.
Any more narrow approach must lead to incomplete and inaccurate re-
sults, or to contradiction with existing rules applicable to airspace flight.
Much more important than any academic or theoretical efforts are the
separate and apparently uncoordinated programs of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the United Nations (through
its Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space). A brief statement of
the present situation would appear to be useful. ICAO was created by the
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944, referred to
above. The convention repeatedly uses the terms airspace and aircraft.
ICAO has the power under the convention to adopt international stand-
ards and procedures dealing with matters concerned with the safety,
regularity and efficiency of air navigation. Pursuant to this authority it
has, in an annex to the convention, defined aircraft as "any machine which
can derive support in the atmosphere from reactions of the air." This is
substantially the same definition adopted over forty years ago in an annex
to the Paris Convention of 1919. ICAO has also the power to adopt
rules of the air. Article 12 of the convention specifically provides that
each contracting State undertakes to keep its own regulation in these
respects uniform to the greatest possible extent with those established
under the convention, and that over the high seas the rules enforced shall
be those established under the convention. Thus far ICAO does not appear
to have taken any action recognizing the use of the airspace by flight
instrumentalities other than aircraft. Nor has it directly or indirectly
sought to determine or state the extent of the area above the surface of
the earth in which its rules of the air may be deemed valid.
ICAO has, however, through its Legal Committee sponsored various
international conventions including the Rome Convention on liability for
damage caused by aircraft to third persons and property on the surface
of the earth. It is also engaged in drafting a convention dealing with
collisions between aircraft. Assuming the continued use of the forty
year-old definition of aircraft, it would appear that neither the ICAO
rules of the air, nor the Rome Convention on liability for surface damage,
nor the draft convention on collisions can be construed to cover activities
related to flight instrumentalities designed primarily for flight above and
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beyond the airspace, even thougHl such instrumentalities may pass through
the airspace when ascending to or descending from outer space.
Man-made flight is a unique phenomenon, involving a very particular
form of human activity. Types of flight instrumentalities may differ.
Strata of space in use may vary. But the identity of the basic human
effort remains constant. It is obvious that the aggregate of the legal rules
applicable to flight should cover all of its phases, but, at the same time
should represent, where practical, a single solution for each separable
problem. This desirable result may not follow the present separate efforts
of ICAO to develop Air Law and those of the United Nations as to Space
Law. ICAO seems concerned solely with the regulation of the flight of
aircraft and the United Nations with spacecraft. Grave danger exists that
unrelated, or even contradictory, rules may result. The present situation
is confused.
In December 1961 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted
the much discussed Resolution 1721 (XVI) in which it commended to
States for their guidance in the exploration and use of outer space the
principles that international law, including the U. N. Charter, applies
to outer space and celestial bodies and that outer space and celestial bodies
are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity with interna-
tional law and are not subject to national appropriation. The resolution
then invited the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, "to study
and report on the legal problems which may arise from the exploration
and use of outer space."
When the Legal Sub-Committee of the United Nations Committee met
in 1962, regulatory proposals were put before it by the U.S.S.R. and by
the U.S.A. dealing with the rescue and return of astronauts and space-
craft in case of accidental or emergency landings. Also the U.S.A. made
a proposal on liability for damage or loss caused by spacecraft. No final
recommendations were made by the Legal Sub-Committee, nor by the
main committee. At the 1962 meeting of the General Assembly all of
these proposals were referred back to the Committee on Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space for further consideration.
It is noteworthy that both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. proposals as to
assistance to astronauts and the return of space vehicles and personnel in
case of accidental or emergency landing dealt solely with occurrences
taking place on the earth's surface and with actions which should follow.
The U.S.A. proposal as to liability dealt with injury or damage caused
by a space vehicle "on land, on the sea, or in the air." No proposal was
made as to what rule of liability should be adopted in case of collisions
between space vehicles in outer space. So far as, the records disclose, ICAO
took no part in the formulation of these proposals nor was it represented
by an observer at the United Nations Committee meetings. The apparent
difficulty is that the U.S.S.R. is not a member of ICAO. Any views
which ICAO might have as to space flight would not be binding upon
the U.S.S.R. Obviously at this stage in the political-legal formulation of
flight rules the agreement of the U.S.S.R. is necessary if they are to become
effective, because only the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. are actively involved
in flight in outer space. But it does seem unfortunate, that the proposals
made in the United Nations Committee regarding accidental landing of
space vehicles seem to have taken no direct account of Articles 25 and 26
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of the Chicago Convention dealing with aircraft in distress and with the
investigation of accidents. If the proposals before the United Nations
should mature into an international agreement, then problems will arise
as to whether such new agreement, or the Chicago Convention provisions,
will apply, dependent only on the type of flight instrumentalities in-
volved. These problems would be particularly difficult if such flight in-
strumentality could be used in the airspace and also in outer space.
The proposals as to liability placed before the United Nations Com-
mittee covered in part the same subject matter as the Rome Convention
dealing with damage to third parties or property on the surface of the
earth and in part the subject matter of collisions between flight instru-
mentalities. These proposals do not seem to have been correlated with the
Rome Convention nor the ICAO Draft Convention on collisions. We
are thus faced with the possibility of varying, or even contradictory sets
of rules depending for their application on a factual determination of
the type of flight instrumentalities in use. It is apparent that the United
Nations approach to Space Law is that it should be the aggregate of the
rules applicable to flight instrumentalities capable of outer space flight,
wherever they are. But no definition of outer space has been offered.
As I have long argued, a single branch of the law must eventually be
accepted to govern all man-made flight, and the rules finally adopted
should be as uniform as can be found practical. This branch of the law,
as suggested in the opening of this article, might be termed Aerospace Law.
Its subject matter might be thus stated:
Aerospace Law comprises the body of legal principles and rules, from time
to time effective, which govern and regulate:
First:
(a) Aerospace, being the earth's envelope of air and the space above it, the
two considered as a single realm for activity in the flight of air vehicles and
in the launching, guidance, and control of ballistic missiles, earth satellites,
dirigible space vehicles, and the like;
(b) Its relationship to land and water areas on the surface of the earth;
(c) The extent and character of the rights of individuals and States to use or




(b) The instrumentalities with which flight is effected, including their na-
tionality, ownership, use or control;
(c) The surface facilities used in connexion with flight, such as airports,
other launching or landing areas, navigation facilities and airways;
Third:
(a) The relationships of every kind affecting or between individuals, com-
munities or States arising from the existence or use of the area of flight
(aerospace), or the instrumentalities or facilities used in connexion there-
with or to make flight effective.
Careful consideration will demonstrate that this definition includes
within its terms those parts of Aerospace Law which might fall within
such arbitrary classification as public or private law, also municipal, state
or international law. A single definition is deemed preferable. But the
major objective must never be lost sight of-the necessity of accepting a
single branch of the law to cover all phases of man-made flight.
